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Abstract—Access control is a crucial part of a system’s security,
restricting what actions users can perform on resources. There-
fore, access control is a core component when dealing with e-
Health data and resources, discriminating which is available for
a certain party. We consider that current systems that attempt
to assure the share of policies between facilities are prone to
system’s and network’s faults and do not assure the integrity
of policies lifecycle. By approaching this problem with the use
of a distributed ledger, namely a consortium blockchain, where
the operations are stored as transactions, we ensure that the
different facilities have knowledge about all the parties that
can act over the e-Health resources while maintaining integrity,
auditability, authenticity, and scalability.
Index Terms—e-Health, Access Control, Blockchain, Dis-
tributed Ledger Technology, Security, Distributed Systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare is experiencing an explosion of data partially
due to the widespread of health data collection systems
such as wearables (e.g. fitness trackers) [1], health tracking
applications (e.g. diet tracking) [2] and ambient assisted
living systems such as CAALYX [3]. By now, it is estimated
that medical data will grow at a rate of 48% per year,
reaching 2.3 zettabytes by the year of 2020 [4].
Lots of new smart objects are empowering the creation
of cyber-physical smart pervasive systems with applica-
tion in multiple domains, including healthcare. These smart
objects are under the umbrella of the Internet of Things
paradigm, that foresees the advance towards new smart
and inter-connected systems by the means of ubiquitous
computing [5].
The explosion of data being collected and, a posteriori,
analyzed by different entities, leads to the debut of data se-
curity and privacy issues. By one hand, these issues are taken
into account because such smart devices may be connected
to the Internet at some point for accessing its collected data
anytime and anywhere [5]. The data being collected from
those devices may be part of the Personal Health Records
(PHR) and this is typically owned by the patients and may
be or not, shared with third-entities [6]. On the other hand,
Electronic Medical Records (EMR) and Electronic Health
Records (EHR) store individual information that is required
by the healthcare professionals and may be shared among
different institutions and facilities [6].
Hence, there is the need to control the accesses to this
data resources by third-entities. Access control is concerned
about determining the allowed activities of certain users,
mediating every attempt by a user to access a resource
in the system [7]. Dealing with the user access control to
health data, personal or medical, holden by different parties,
which may be required to be accessed by third-parties with
different goals (e.g. insurance companies versus doctors), is
not an easy task. This is especially problematic when we are
still moving towards a unified and interoperable electronic
health (e-Health) systems [8].
In this paper, we suggest an approach to the problem of
access control in large scale and distributed systems, as it is
observed in e-Health scenarios where different entities and
users should be able to access data with different permission
levels and granularities. The Data Keepers should be able
to manage the accesses to their data by the means of adding,
changing or revoking permissions. Such system should be
also capable of defining fine-grained permissions both, at
the user level and, at the resource level.
The system must also be fault tolerant, which means
that it must not be dependable on a centralized architecture.
Upon these considerations: consistency, integrity and au-
thenticity of the operations among nodes should be assured.
The system must be also immutable providing an accurate
audit trail.
This paper is structured as follows: firstly, it is given
an overview over the related work in the scope of per-
mission management in e-Health systems, focusing also
blockchain approaches for access control. Afterwards is it
given a description of the purposed solution architecture.
Then we address some core details of the proof-of-concept
implementation. Finally, some final remarks are presented,
summing up the contributions as well as pointing out further
developments.
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2. BACKGROUND & STATE OF THE ART
2.1. BLOCKCHAIN
In our solution, we take into consideration a Distributed
Ledger Technology (DLT), specifically, blockchain. A dis-
tributed ledger (also known as shared ledger) consists of
a consensus of replicated, shared and synchronized digital
data distributed along a set of nodes, working as a distributed
database, generally geographically dispersed [9]. It is impor-
tant to note that, despite all blockchains being distributed
ledgers, not all distributed ledgers are blockchains.
The blockchain is a specific type of distributed ledger
conceptualized by Satoshi Nakamoto and used as a core
component of the digital currency Bitcoin [10]. Data in
a blockchain should be tamper-proof, specifically accom-
plished by the use of cryptography, by the means of digital
signatures and digital fingerprints (hashing) [9], [10]. Also,
consensus must be assured among peers considering scenar-
ios where some of the peers are providing erroneous data, by
partially or completed computer/network failures or, even,
by malicious intent when some party tries to subvert the
ledger [10].
A blockchain consists of a chain of blocks that contains
information about transactions. Each one of these trans-
actions, is digitally signed by the entity emitting them.
Transactions are combined into a block, that is committed to
the chain, establishing the blockchain. Each block contains
the hash of the previous block, being this propagated along
the chain until the first block, created when the blockchain
was firstly created, designed genesis block [10].
We can then consider that a blockchain works as a state
transaction system (state machine), where there is a state
that corresponds to the snapshot of the chain (the result
of all transaction until now) and, after adding a new block
of transactions to the chain, we got a new snapshot that
corresponds to a new state of the system, as result of the
new transactions [11].
In order to a validate a block, it is necessary a proof-of-
work. This mechanism is used in order to get a consensus
in the peer-to-peer network [10]. In Bitcoin an HashCash
proof-of-work is used, being the work effort called mining.
The mining consists of finding a nonce (by the means
of brute-force) that satisfies the condition of generating a
digest with the required number of leading zeroes. This
proof-of-work guarantees consensus in a network following
the principle that the nodes will always accept the longest
available chain [10]. This also implies that older blocks -
those further back in the blockchain - are more secure than
newer ones.
There are alternatives to proof-of-work. In the proof-of-
stake, as it is being considered to be used in Ethereum [11],
the creator of the next block to be pushed in the chain is
chosen in a deterministic way based on the wealth of the
node [9]. Another one, as used in the Sawtooth Lake [12],
uses a Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET), which is a lottery-
based consensus protocol that takes advantage of the trusted
execution environments provided by Intel’s Software Guard
Extensions.
Notwithstanding the common use of blockchain for trade
currencies, like Bitcoin, there exists an array of other ap-
plications for the technology. This is possible because, as
blockchain is used to store coin transactions but it can be
used to store any other domain transactions. Furthermore,
it can be used as a general-purpose database distributed
system, therefore make it useful in a large variety of sit-
uations [13].
Lastly, blockchains can be considered of three main
kinds, as stated by Buterin [14], namely: public, fully-private
and consortium. Public blockchains (e.g. Bitcoin), is a type
of blockchain in which anyone can read, send transactions
to and expect to see them included if they are valid, and,
further, anyone in the world can participate in the consensus
process. Fully-private blockchains consists of blockchains
where write permissions are kept centralized to one organi-
zation (even if spread among facilities), existing a closed
group of known participants (e.g. a supply chain) [13].
Finally, consortium blockchains, are partly private in such
way that the consensus process is controlled by a number
of pre-selected set of nodes. In this type of blockchain, the
right to query the blockchain may be public, or restricted to
the participants (e.g. governmental institutions and partners).
2.2. ACCESS CONTROL
The problem of access control has already been cov-
ered in the literature. We can observe different ways of
controlling and managing accesses in different situations in
our everyday technological systems. There exists a problem
of defining permission rules, typically known as policies,
alongside with the problems related with inconsistency, es-
pecially in e-Health systems [15].
One of the more common approaches is the use of
Access Control Lists (ACL), commonly used in modern
operating systems. ACL consists of a list associated with
an object that specifies all the subjects that can access it,
along with the access level (or rights) [7].
Other systems use Access Control Matrix, in which,
each row represents a subject, each column an object and
each entry is the set of access rights for that subject to that
object [7].
Specifically in healthcare, Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) have
been applied [16]. RBAC defines the user’s access right
basing itself on his/her roles and the role-specific privileges
associated with them. The ABAC system extends the RBAC
role-based features to attributes, such as properties of the
resource, entities, and the environment [17]. Policies in
ABAC can be expressed resorting to the eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML), defined by the OASIS
consortium [18]. The XACML standard also includes a
reference architecture for designing and implement access
control systems, defining the system components and usage
flow, that can be used in multiple application domains.
Another approach to access control is the Entity-Based
Access Control (EBAC) [19], which allows the definition
of more expressive access control policies. This is accom-
plished by supporting both, the comparison of attribute
values, as well as traversing relationships along arbitrary
entities. Moreover, Bogaerts et al. presents Auctoritas as
an authorization system that specifies a practical policy
language and evaluation engine for the EBAC system [19].
2.3. BLOCKCHAIN APPLIED TO ACCESS
CONTROL
With the widespread use of DLT, and, more specifically,
blockchain, novel approaches to resolve the access control
problematic appeared using this paradigm, including in e-
Health scenarios. Maesa et al. [20] proposes a blockchain-
based access control, implementing ABAC on top of the
blockchain technology, following the XACML reference ar-
chitecture. This approach validates itself through a reference
implementation on top of Bitcoin. However this solution
does not encompass the particularities of using such in e-
Health context, namely, the possibility of having different
authorities and/or entities as resource owners.
In the application of blockchain for e-Health, Yue et
al. [21] proposes the use of a Healthcare Data Gateway
(HGD) to enable the patient to own, control and share
their data while maintaining data privacy. This solution also
encompasses that all the patient e-Health record is stored
in a blockchain. Although the novelty of such approach, it
implies a disruptive change on the already-existent systems
of storing and retrieving e-Health data, what would require
a considerable effort to implement which may call into
question its current applicability. Also, there are cases where
it is needed to access data without the explicit agreement
from the patient itself (e.g. due to the patient inability to
allow the access or by some governmental requirements)
and this solution does not provide the ability to do such
(e.g. some family member allow the data access). Also,
considering the growth of e-Health data, storing this data on
the blockchain itself will result in a rapid growth on its size,
exceeding publicly available hard drive capacity, requiring
special hardware to full nodes and, further, could lead to the
centralization of the blockchain [22].
3. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO
As of today, there exists an increment of the e-Health
data being produced at different sources. Such data can
come from more traditional origins like medical exams
or medical reports, but, with the advent of the Internet-
of-Things, things like wearables (e.g. fitness trackers) and
ambient assisted living systems, even more data is being
produced and consumed by the individual and/or by 3rd-
parties. However, it is hard to keep track on the localization
of such data as well as when and who is consuming that
data. As such, there must exist an access control system
transversal to the e-Health domain that allows one to keep
data ownership, managing easily the access policies in place.
Such system must be clear to the user, as it can easily
authorize, deny or revoke permissions on-the-fly (e.g. by
the means of a mobile application and push notifications).
Figure 1. An example of an access to e-Health data, including its different
participants. In detail, a third-party entity can request access to a given
document, and, in order to do so, the access must be allowed by a request
handler system. Such handler should then verify the request by checking
an access control policies repository and, further, it must grant or deny the
access. If some previously unknown request appears, Data Keepers must
issue a new access control policy.
An illustrative scenario for observing how an access
control system is required to work and, how it would impact
the e-Health workflow a case study was designed. A draft
of such scene is given on Figure 1. Here we can define
the two major actors of such scenario, Data Keepwers and
Third-Parties.
Data Keepers is the set of individuals or entities that
have ownership over a certain data-entry. They can be, but
are not limited to, the data creators, institution responsible,
or the data subject(s). The possibility of defining different
sets of keepers is a requirement since, depending on the
e-Health record or source, different restrictions may apply.
Namely, when dealing with PHR data the only keeper is
the individual or the legal responsible [23]. However, EMR
data is controlled by a set of clinicians and staff within one
health care organization, and, further, EHR data can even
be shared between more than one health organization [23].
Third-parties are any organization, entity or individual
that have interest in accessing the data (e.g. insurance com-
panies or research institutes). Generally, these consumers
have time-limited access to a small portion of data of a
dataset or to a specific individual.
In detail, we can sum up the interaction of the different
parties and the system as it follows (using the Figure 1 as
reference):
1) There is a 3rd Party who have interest in viewing
a specific e-Health record (in Figure 1 as example
we use the document id #123). This party asks to an
intermediate if it can access the record mentioned;
2) The intermediate checks the access against an Ac-
cess Policy repository where it matches with al-
ready existent policies. If there is no Access Policy
within a particular third-entity and a document, an
extra two steps occurs: (1) A notification with the
details of the access request is sent to the set of
document keepers; (2) The access keepers must
allow or deny the access request. If there is more
than one keeper on the document, a consensus
must be reached. This consensus depends on the
proprieties of the document and it can require the
approval of one keeper, majority or all.
3) After checking the request against the Access Poli-
cies repository, the intermediate grants or denies
access to the document by the 3rd-party;
4) If access is allowed, the 3rd Party can now view
the specific e-Health record (in Figure 1 the docu-
ment id #123). If not, the request is denied and the
entity cannot access the document in any way.
Taking into account the interaction flow we can say that
the scenario shares the three main components of common
access control systems (specified in XACML standard),
namely, a Policy Decision Point (PDP), a Policy Administra-
tion Point (PAP) and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) [18].
Here, the PEP is the intermediate negotiator that inter-
cepts the users’ requests and enforces the PDP’s decision.
Further, the PDP is responsible for evaluating the requests
against an Access Policies repository. However, in our case,
there is not a traditional PAP, because there is no central
authority managing the policies, being each one of the doc-
ument keepers managers of their own documents, working
as a distributed PAP system.
In this paper, we leverage the use of blockchain as a
repository for Access Policies, and, furthermore, as a way
of enabling the existence of a distributed PAP component.
4. PROPOSED APPROACH
Our approach consists of using Blockchain technology
as a way to accomplish a more reliable and user-empowered
solution for access control management in an e-Health en-
vironment. Such approach allows us to define fine-grained
access control while maintaining the consensus in a dis-
tributed system, authenticity, immutability and auditability.
A proof-of-concept of the approach hereby described and
detailed was implemented in order to verify its feasibility.
In our solution, we use an approach similar to the
Access Control Matrix, which allows the establishment of
a correspondence between a subject, an object and a set
of rights. However, this information is not stored as is,
due to the inherent proprieties of the use of blockchain.
As a transaction-based state machine, we store transactions
corresponding to a pre-defined set of the state machine on
the Access Policies repository.
4.1. Access Control Model
Upfront for defining our model, it is needed to define all
the entities and relationships enrolled in it. Such model is
given in Figure 2, and five classes can be identified in our
approach.
Figure 2. UML diagram specifying the classes of the system and their
relationships.
First off, we have Entities that can be 3rd Party’s or
Data Keepers. Further, we have Policies and Records.
Each Policy refers to a relation between one and only
one 3rd Party and an e-Health Record, with the respective
level of access, PermissionLevel. In turn, each Record
can have one or more Data Keepers that have partial or
total ownership over it.
Figure 3. State machine diagram representing the lifecycle of an access
request by a 3rd Party. The composite state AUTH_CHECK represents the
individual authorization requests needed by the Data Keepers of the
record being queried.
Figure 4. State machine diagram representing the individual authorization
lifecycle.
Moreover, the information related to the model is pre-
served by the means of storing transactions (since this model
is compatible with the use of blockchain). The transactions
contain information about with 3 different state machines,
that have dependencies between them, being always related
to the class model defined.
Access Policy State Machine, as represented in Figure
3, is the state machine related to the main logic of creating
Access Policies.
Record Life-cycle State Machine is responsible for
the operations over an e-Health record. The record lifecycle
begins with its creation, CREATE, then it can suffer diverse
updates, UPDATE, until it is removed, REMOVE.
Individual Authorization State Machine, as repre-
sented in Figure 4, describes the lifecycle for each user
access grants over a given REQUIRE, which lead to a
number of instantiations equal to the number of Data
Keepers required. Each individual instantiation evokes
a REQUIRE_ACTION, then the Data Keeper can allow
(AUTH_GRANT) or deny (AUTH_DENY) the access. Eventually,
before reaching the final state, the Data Keeper can revoke
(AUTH_REVOKE) a previously granted authorization.
As stated, the main logic of attributing Access Policies
for 3rd Party access an e-Health record is controlled by
the Access Policy State Machine, detailed in Figure 3.
This state machine jumps the init state when an access
request, REQUEST from a 3rd Party enters the PEP. Then,
the REQUEST is verified, VERIFY, against the already existent
information on the blockchain (by the means of a snapshot
operation). If, and only if, the information about this par-
ticular access is present in the snapshot, the request can be
granted, AUTH_GRANT or denied AUTH_DENY.
Additionally, if there is no information about an access
request, the Access Policy must be required, REQUIRE, by
the means of checking the number of permissions required
form the textttData Keepers in order to get a consensus
(specific to the record), using for that the Individual Autho-
rization State Machine. This means that there is no central
authority authorizing requests from 3rd Parties, and it is
required that some set of Data Keepers allow the access.
While this process is running, the state machine enters into
a waiting state, WAITING_AUTH_CHECK.
At last, there can be a point in the future when it is
needed to revoke a previously granted access, AUTH_REVOKE.
The final state is, by this, reached by the existence of an
AUTH_REVOKE or an AUTH_DENY.
4.2. Block Model
As our Access Control follows the model presented in
Subsection 4.1, based upon transactions, we leverage the
use of blockchain as a repository for these transactions.
This way we never have a current state of the permissions
written in the repository, but, notwithstanding, we can take
a snapshot to the blockchain at any moment and, as result,
check the Access Policies in place.
The basic structure of a block in our chain is the fol-
lowing:
• index: Corresponds to the index of the current block
in the blockchain.
• timestamp: Timestamp corresponding to when the
block was generated.
• previousHash: Hash of the previous block in the
chain.
• digitalSign: Digital signature of the current block
data.
• data: Content of the block. Corresponds to a set of
transactions describing the access control policies,
records information and individual authorizations.
• nonce: Value that is set so that the hash of the block
will contain a run of leading zeros. This value is
calculated iteratively until the required number of
zero bits in the hash is found. This requires time
and resources, making it so that the correct nonce
value constitutes proof-of-work.
• hash: A SHA256 hash corresponding to the block
data. This hash must have a leading a priori defined
sequence being this leading sequence what defines
the effort of the proof-of-work. In Bitcoin, this lead-
ing sequence corresponds to a certain number of
zeros in the beginning of the hash.
Additionally, focusing on our approach, the data field
should be detailed, as it is the field that serves as transaction
information storage. This data field includes in it three sub-
fields, namely:
• records: Transaction information relative to trans-
actions of the state machine presented in Figure ??,
about creation, update or deletion of e-Health records
of any kind.
• policies: Transaction information relative to trans-
actions of the state machine presented in Figure 3,
about creation and revocation of access policies.
• individualAuths: Transactions about individual
authorization by each one of a Record Data Keeper
in relation to each Policy.
The use of hashes allows us to maintain integrity along
the immutable chain of transactions without a central au-
thority, since any change in the data would result in a
different hash, invalidating the next blocks in the blockchain.
Additionally, as result, we can also achieve accountability
and auditability. Authenticity is assured by the assign of
a key-pair to each entity with access to the blockchain,
identifying who write each block in the chain.
4.3. Architectural Design
At the system architectural level, our approach uses
blockchain, being distributed by default, working as a peer-
to-peer network connecting the different nodes, correspond-
ing to the diverse facilities or organizations that can store,
create or/and change e-Health data. Nodes in the network
synchronize between them by following a set of rules:
• When a new block is generated by a node, this block
is broadcasted to the network;
• When a node connects to a new peer in the network
it queries for the latest block;
Figure 5. Overview of the system architecture and interactions. The e-
Health data access requests treated seamlessly by the handler. Additionally,
the resources (e-Health data) are, typically, associated with one facility or
repository, but all the available resources are known by all nodes (facilities).
• If a node finds a block that has a higher index than
the last known block, it either adds the block to its
current blockchain (in the case of the difference is
equal to one node) or queries another node to get
the full blockchain.
The system implements a consortium blockchain [14],
which means that the blockchain is partly private, in the
way that instead of allowing any person to participate in
the process of transaction verification or, allowing only
one entity to have full control, a few selected nodes are
predetermined, providing the same benefits associated with
private blockchain. The Data Keepers and 3rd Party can
then interact with the system by the means of using public
available Application Programming Interfaces (API’s) or
applications designed to do such.
Furthermore, despite the use of XACML standard for
access control systems and blockchain as storage, there
are some architectural choices due to the e-Health domain
restrictions and more complex use cases. An overview can
be observed in Figure 5.
Focusing on the e-Health Data, as of today, this data
is not aggregated in one storage, being spread by multiple
institutions and organizations. As such, every time that any
3rd Party requests access to a specific record there is the
need of locating this information, and then, proceed to
check if the request is already approved or if there is the
need to create a new access policy. So, as an improvement,
information about the creation of new records must be kept
and spread along all the organizations and facilities in such
way that a request to a resource can be handled by any
member of the private blockchain.
Additionally, aiming attention to the Data Keepers, it
was noticed that there is a set of situations where the owner-
ship of e-Health data records is not explicit to only one entity
but shared among more than one entity or individual, as is
the case of EMR versus PHR. Taking this into account, we
set up a mechanism of consensus when creating new access
policies. Each e-Health record has a level of agreement that
must be achieve before allowing a 3rd Party the access to
a Resource, being this level associated with the Resource
itself (Figure 2). Then, there is a number of executions
of the individual authorization state machine (Figure 4)
corresponding to the number of that Record Data Keepers.
Reaching the minimum number of individual authorization
(that can be either AUTH_GRANT or AUTH_DENY), the access
request state machine (Figure 3) will create an access policy
accordantly with the consensus reached (that can be, once
more, either AUTH_GRANT or AUTH_DENY).
From the functional architecture viewpoint, we can sum
up the system interaction as stated in the sequence diagram
of the Figure 6. This diagram describes the process of a
3rd Party requesting access to an e-Health Record, owned
partially or totally by one or more Data Keepers. Further,
the diagram describes both the case of checking against
an already existent access policy of the 3rd Party and the
Record or the process of creating a new Policy by checking
the necessary number of Data Keepers.
4.4. Security Threat Analysis
In our approach, there are a number of security questions
that must be taken into consideration since we have to
consider that mistakes can be made by, for example, careless
operators. Alongside with threats coming from human mis-
takes, there is the need of considering also faults introduced
by intentional system manipulation coming from individuals
with malicious intent. Note that we assume that system’s
operators do not have physical access to the machines where
the Access Control system is deployed, communicating only
by an existent GUI/CLI.
Why existing Access Control system storage do
not suffice?. Currently deployed systems use a centralized
or almost-centralized (quasi-decentralized) solution to store
and access control policies, independently on how these
policies are described (e.g. ACL, RBAC or EBAC). Such
systems are vulnerable to network or machine failures since
in case of failure all the facilities are affected by the impos-
sibility of validating access control policy rules over their
resources. The use of a DLT as a purely-distributed database
for storing the policies allows the correct functioning of all
non-falling facilities and automatically synchronizes when
the normal function of the system is restored. Additionally,
even if a node is compromised, the threat is confined to the
node specifically, not compromising the whole network.
Why do Access Control systems have difficulties
ensuring the validity of policies lifecyle?. Access Control
systems typical record the addition, revoking or change in a
policy by the means of logging. Such approach is vulnerable
to modifications by a malicious third-party because there is
no way of assuring the integrity of these logs. The use of
a blockchain as a way of storing policies as transactions,
assures us that older policies (and operations over them)
have integrity and are frequently recomputed from a set
of trusted commands. Additionally, we can ensure that, as
time passes (and the blockchain grows), the blocks are more
secure as you go further back in the chain.
What does it take to a third-entity with malicious
intent to add a rogue policy?. As the access to resources
Figure 6. Sequential view on how some 3rd Party can access or request access to an e-Health resource, detailing the communication between the inner
modules of the architecture. It is also visible the process of creation of new access control policies.
present in the e-Health system must be validated by the
means of a policy in the Access Control system, successful
violation by a malicious party is unconditionally dependent
on the injection of a rogue permission into the system.
Such attempt can be mainly made by two attack vectors:
(i) by attempting to mine a new block in the blockchain,
though our approach makes that unlikely due to the usage
of a consortium blockchain, where only allowed entities
can add blocks; hence, there is the need of such malicious
entity to take over more than 51% of the entire blockchain
network to accomplish such task; and (ii) by compromising
an Access Control system machine or any third-application
that communicates with it, allowing a party to submit one or
more rogue policies to the system. This last type of attack
cannot be prevented by the blockchain, and thus relies on
good security practices on edge applications and devices.
What are the privacy implications of having a trans-
parent ACL system?. As the data stored in the blockchain
is available to all nodes that belong to it, some privacy
concerns can arise. However, since the approach consists of
a consortium blockchain, all the nodes are, a priori, well-
known and trustworthy, mitigating the privacy concerns of
a public blockchain.
5. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
During the implementation of the proof-of-concept,
some decisions were made; we describe these details here
with the intent of helping the reader to re-implement a
similar proof-of-concept or production-ready system.
The whole system, from the transactions logic to
the writing to the blockchain, was implemented using
Javascript due to the simplicity of the language and
availability of libraries. Such libraries, as for example, the
built-in crypto module provides us with a mechanism to
digitally sign the blocks payload using public-key cryptog-
raphy (using RSA-SHA256) and to calculate the hashes of
each block using SHA256 algorithm.
From our perspective and due to the huge dispar-
ity among data types, three main classes were created:
Document, Entity and Transaction.
The information of the State Machines mentioned in
section 4.1 is given by the Transactions data present in
each moment and not by the states of the machine itself.
Thus, the current state of the system given by the process
of snapshot. A snapshot is like a picture taken from the
blockchain, consisting of applying all previous transactions
until now in order to get the state of all operations. As
example, for evaluate a access request requires the execution
of all transactions about that specific 3rd Party, Record
and associated Data Keepers.
The implemented blockchain uses proof-of-work that
bases itself on a brute-force mechanism of hash calculation.
This mechanism works as the nonce is iteratively incre-
mented until the resulting SHA256 hash matches the a priori
defined number of leading zeroes — this is similar to the
Bitcoin system and establishes the “effort”.
However, we can easily tweak the “effort” to better suit
our use-case. Although we implemented the proof-of-work
mechanism, due to its simplicity, there are alternatives as
Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET) or proof-of-stake mecha-
nisms, that are not as resource consuming as the imple-
mented one, which can be better to validate the transactions
in the context of a consortium blockchain applied to e-
Health scenarios.
One of the details that required some attention was the
writing of blocks to the blockchain. As previously men-
tioned, each transaction has a unique identifier (ID) to allow
the identification of the same transaction over its different
states. This helps to prevent different states of the same
transaction from being written to the same block.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present an approach to solving the prob-
lem of managing access control in the e-Health ecosystem.
Access Control is a special complex task in e-Health since
resources and data are distributed among different facilities
and institutions. Further, this is even more problematic
because in some cases, e-Health resources are not owned
or managed by a single entity or individual. As a way of
overcoming this complexity, we propose an approach that
leverages the use of blockchain for store transactional infor-
mation about e-Health records and access control policies.
For purposes of supporting the plausibility of our so-
lution, a proof-of-concept was designed and implemented.
This proof-of-concept allowed us to make some, even if
preliminary, tests and validations over our approach from
a functional and applicational perspective.
Overall, we determine that our approach is viable, giving
diverse advantages when comparing to the in-place systems.
This advantages although, not limited to, includes the in-
tegrity, transparency, and authenticity of the access control
policies in the system, being, this information distributed
and synchronized by all the institutions and organizations
that make part of the consortium.
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